Konuşmacılar
Açıklama
The talk aims to explicate a new information-theoretic account of the self and some of its main features, e.g., the phenomenal aspect. The substantivalist theory of the self lost part of its allure because it did not receive much support from advancements in the cognitive sciences. However, the scientific findings of the field have not been developed into a viable philosophical account of the selfhood. The talk draws on recent developments in computational neuroscience to depict an informational/structural alternative to the substantivalist account with a broad-brush. It also explains how this emerging model fills the extant lacuna without reverting to the traditional conception which does not receive support from the cognitive sciences.
Speaker: Majid D. Beni is a philosopher of science and cognitive science. He has published numerous papers on philosophy of neuroscience and philosophy of cognitive science. He has published two books, Cognitive Structural Realism with Springer and Structuring the Self with Palgrave. He is currently assistant professor at METU, the department of philosophy.